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Abstract
Health system resilience reflects the ability to continue service delivery in the face of extraordinary
shocks. We examined the case of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and its
delivery of services to Palestine refugees in Syria during the ongoing crisis to identify factors
enabling system resilience. The study is a retrospective qualitative case study utilizing diverse
methods. We conducted 35 semi-structured interviews with UNRWA clinical and administrative
professionals engaged in health service delivery over the period of the Syria conflict. Through a
group model building session with a sub-group of eight of these participants, we then elicited a
causal loop diagram of health system functioning over the course of the war, identifying pathways
of threat and mitigating resilience strategies. We triangulated analysis with data from UNRWA an-
nual reports and routine health management information. The UNRWA health system generally
sustained service provision despite individual, community and system challenges that arose dur-
ing the conflict. We distinguish absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of the system
facilitating this resilience. Absorptive capacities enabled immediate crisis response, drawing on
available human and organizational resources. Adaptive capacities sustained service delivery
through revised logistical arrangements, enhanced collaborative mechanisms and organizational
flexibility. Transformative capacity was evidenced by the creation of new services in response to
changing community needs. Analysis suggests factors such as staff commitment, organizational
flexibility and availability of collaboration mechanisms were important assets in maintaining
service continuity and quality. This evidence regarding alternative strategies adopted to sustain
service delivery in Syria is of clear relevance to other actors seeking organizational resilience in
crisis contexts.
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Introduction
After more than 8 years of war, approximately 55% of Syrians have
been forced to leave their homes. In total, 6.6 million Syrians have
been internally displaced, over 5 million have sought refuge in
neighbouring countries (i.e. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan; UNHCR,
2018) and a further 1.2 million have sought refuge in Europe
(Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2017). The humanitarian crisis has
also had a substantial impact on the Palestine refugees registered in
Syria (PRS). Prior to the conflict, 80% of PRS lived in the greater
Damascus area, and the rest in or around camps close to the major
cities (UNRWA, 2014). As a consequence of the war, 58% of PRS
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have become internally displaced, whereas over 50 000 remain
trapped in ‘hard to reach’ areas, often deprived of medical care and
food supplies for prolonged durations (UNRWA, 2018). Others
have left Syria for neighbouring countries, including Jordan and
Lebanon. However, both these countries attempted to limit such
movement through the introduction of migration bans in January
2013 (Amnesty International, 2013) and May 2014, respectively
(Janmyr, 2016; UNRWA, 2016).
Since 2011, violence has extended to all Palestine refugee camps
in Syria. The Yarmouk camp, considered the capital of the
Palestinian diaspora, was subjected to prolonged siege and repeated
attacks from December 2012. Residents of the camp dwindled from
160 000 PRS to <18 000 by the end of 2013 (Atlantic Council,
2018). As the war intensified, hundreds of PRS died due to starva-
tion, lack of medical care or sniper fire (Amnesty International,
2014). The current PRS population at Yarmouk stands at fewer
than 1000 and is subject to recurrent violent clashes (Sanchez,
2018).
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides services to the 5.4
million Palestine refugees living in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza
and the West Bank. Prior to the Syrian war, UNRWA’s Syria field
office offered services to 527 000 PRS, utilizing 23 primary health-
care centres. In 2013 alone, the armed conflict led to the destruction
of 10 UNRWA health facilities (UNRWA, 2014). This was particu-
larly problematic at a time when insecurity and lack of financial and
other essential resources increased PRS reliance on UNRWA
(2017b).
In the context of considering the concept of resilience, shocks are
sudden and generally negative events possessing substantial impacts
affecting the livelihood of people and the functioning of a state or a
system (OECD, 2014). In these terms, the war in Syria and the
myriad of challenges arising from it clearly constituted a major
shock to the UNRWA health system and to the population it serves.
Response to shock is a central point of focus for health system resili-
ence and resilience research. Kieny et al. (2014) defined health sys-
tems’ resilience as the ability of health systems to maintain service
provision in times of chaos and uncertainty. Thomas et al. (2013)
emphasized the ability to return to equilibrium or steady-state with-
out inducing any change to structure or function. Others have sug-
gested a health system can be considered resilient when it is able to
avoid collapse by adapting and transforming its structures (Leach
et al., 2010; Davoudi et al., 2012). Despite differences in emphasis,
these definitions share an understanding of resilience as related to a
system’s capacity to respond adaptively to an external shock that
challenges its functioning.
In this article, we consider the resilience of the UNRWA health
system in response to the shock of the Syria conflict. We identify the
challenges faced by the PRS community and the UNRWA health
system and investigate the strategies adopted by UNRWA to enable
sustained service delivery throughout the prolonged crisis. Utilizing
Blanchet’s capacity-oriented resilience framework (Blanchet et al.,
2017), we seek to strengthen understanding of processes of health
systems resilience and identify supportive strategies for other health
systems facing major shocks. Adopting a systems lens, our focus was
explicitly on the internal dynamics of response and resilience within
UNRWA and the coping mechanisms adopted to address the diffi-
culties faced in such a challenging environment.
Methods
Study design
The study design is a retrospective qualitative case study, utilizing
diverse methods. We present the case of the UNRWA-Syria health
system in sustaining service delivery to PRS during the Syria war.
Informed by a review of the literature that utilizes Blanchet’s ‘ab-
sorptive, adaptive and transformative’ resilience framing (Blanchet
et al., 2017; Alameddine et al., 2019) and the desire to increase
trustworthiness and reliability, the study triangulated data from
semi-structured interviews, group model building (GMB) sessions
and annual health reports.
Semi-structured interviews
Thirty-five semi-structured key informant interviews were carried
out in Syria between February and August 2017. Interviews were
conducted at the Syria field office in Damascus and at three clinics
representing the diversity of contexts where services were delivered
to PRS: Jaramana, City Center Polyclinic and Aleppo. The first two
health centres were in a rural and an urban setting, respectively, and
were characterized by large enrolment of internally displaced per-
sons. The Aleppo centre faced particularly high levels of violence
and insecurity.
Participants, belonging to UNRWA’s healthcare cadre in Syria,
were purposively sampled to secure representation from different
departments, stations and roles. Participants comprised area health
managers and health centre staff (physician, pharmacist, clerk, prac-
tice nurse, staff nurse, midwife and lab technician). For inclusion,
participants must have worked in the designated clinics or associ-
ated service for a period of at least 1 year at the time of the inter-
view. Taking into consideration mobility restrictions, insecurity and
other challenges during data collection that might have compro-
mised participants’ confidentiality and safety, it was judged inappro-
priate to interview participants belonging to community
associations and representatives from the Ministry of Health, as we
had done in similar studies in Lebanon and Jordan (Alameddine
et al., 2019).
Key Messages
• United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) faced a variety of challenges throughout the Syrian conflict, includ-
ing at individual, community and system levels.
• We use participatory causal loops to document a number of absorptive, adaptive and transformative strategies which
UNRWA utilized, allowing it to provide resilient health services.
• Factors such as willingness to devolve decision-making to local levels, staff commitment, community cohesion and col-
laboration mechanisms were identified as key resources in enabling service continuity and quality.
• Underlying these factors are an organizational culture which prioritizes the community it serves and the staff which
work for it, as well as a history of managing chronic crises.
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Interviews were pre-scheduled at participants’ convenience and
took place at the health facility. A field researcher based in Syria car-
ried out all interviews in Arabic, privately with each participant
after securing and recording an oral consent. A semi-structured topic
guide—previously used during similar studies in Gaza (Ager, 2016),
Lebanon and Jordan (Alameddine et al., 2019)—was used to probe
direct participant experiences from 2010 (pre-Syria crisis) to the
time of the interview. Interviews lasted an average of 25 min.
Recordings of the interviews were transcribed verbatim and
translated by the research co-ordinator (ZJ); Arabic native speakers
in the research team (FF, MA) verified translations. Transcripts
were imported into Dedoose (Lieber, 2018), a web application for
qualitative data analysis. Following repeated reads of the transcripts
to gain analytic insight of the data (data immersion), these were in-
ductively coded by two researchers (ZJ, KD; inter-rater correlation
coefficient 0.78). Codes were iteratively refined and reduced to rele-
vant categories following the constant comparison method (Glaser,
1965; see Supplementary Appendix S1 for coding tree). Emergent
themes were refined in research group discussions. The research
team grouped, classified and discussed inductively defined themes in
light of a theoretical framing of resilience capacities distinguishing
absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities (Blanchet et al.,
2017). The analysis also supported the construction of a systems
seed model that was reviewed and expanded during the GMB.
Document review
We reviewed UNRWA annual health reports from 2010 to 2017 to
document UNRWA health service provision, operations reforms
and service coverage before and throughout the Syria crisis.
Group model building
Following interview analysis, researchers convened eight members
of the UNRWA-Syria health team (comprising participants from
each of the targeted clinics and from the Syria field office in
Damascus) for a 2-day GMB workshop in Beirut in August 2017.
Drawing on principles of participatory GMB (Hovmand et al.,
2011, 2012; Ager et al., 2015a, 2015b; Lembani et al., 2015), a ser-
ies of participatory ‘scripts’ were used to elicit rich picture drawings
(Armson, 2011), participant perceptions of trends over time and
preliminary causal loop diagrams (Armson, 2011; Hovmand et al.,
2011, 2012).
Activities culminated in the development of a participant-derived
UNRWA-Syria health system model. This was compared with a pre-
liminary seed model developed by researchers based on interview
findings. Participants and research team members reviewed both
models and developed a unified model structure. Post-workshop,
modellers in the research team (KD, ZJ, GL, AA and SW) further
refined this model—drawing on information from UNRWA Annual
Reports—to clarify linkages, consulting with UNRWA field office
staff as appropriate to confirm coherence of understanding and dis-
cussing findings at a workshop in UNRWA headquarters in Amman
in January 2018 (see sample of concept model in Supplementary
Appendix S2; accessed on https://youtu.be/BZTr4NLyKes).
Within each model, arrows were, where appropriate, assigned a
(þ) or () sign to indicate the suggested relationship between the
linked variables. Variables that change in the same direction are
linked by arrows of positive polarity; e.g. as staff workload
increases, staff pressure also increases. Arrows assigned a negative
polarity denote an inversely proportional or negative relationship;
e.g. as insecurity due to the conflict increases, the security of health
facilities decreases.
Loops were further analysed to determine their systems impact
and marked as either ‘reinforcing’ or ‘balancing’. ‘Reinforcing loops’
are those where variable effects are cumulative; ‘balancing loops’
are those where the net effect of changes in variables is for stabiliz-
ing the overarching cycle (Sterman, 2001).
Ethics
We obtained UNRWA HQ authorization to carry out the research
and access UNRWA data systems. Ethical approval was secured
from relevant institutional review boards of XXX (Queen Margaret
University, UK) and YYY (American University of Beirut, Lebanon).
All data collection activities were carried out in accordance with the
approved IRB protocols of the concerned research institutions in
Lebanon and the UK.
Earlier studies and reports have shared incidences of weaponiza-
tion of healthcare and revealed that health workers were repeatedly
and directly victimized by the warring parties in Syria (Fouad et al.,
2017; Schlein, 2018). Therefore, we anticipated that potential inter-
viewees might be reluctant to participate in the study or disclose cer-
tain information. Potential dangers and security concerns were
particularly evident when conducting interviews in Aleppo, where
fieldwork was postponed for 3 months due to active hostilities.
To mitigate these risks and sensitivities, the research team deemed
essential the recruitment of a field researcher who was familiar with
both UNRWA processes and the setting in Syria (although not
engaged within the health sector). Furthermore, special travel
arrangements were made for UNRWA-Syria staff to enable their
participation in the GMB workshop in Beirut. Support and assuran-
ces from the UNRWA administration towards its staff during the
course of data collection—particularly regarding the anonymization
of all interview material—was crucial for data integrity and person-
nel security.
As noted above, we judged interviewing patient representatives
from communities to be inappropriate due to security risks, threats
to anonymity and concerns that—in the context of prevailing inse-
curity—interviews by UNRWA Social Service employees would
risk being coercive with non-participation likely being perceived to
jeopardize receiving aid and/or services. Similar ethical concerns
constrained engagement with external stakeholders working with
governmental or non-governmental organizations.
Findings
We start by noting the challenges arising at individual and commu-
nity levels before considering UNRWA system-level challenges and
resilience capabilities. Figure 1 displays the pathways of threat (indi-
cated in red) affecting individual, community and health system
functioning during the crisis.
Threats to individual and community function
We identified two primary threats to individual and community live-
lihoods and well-being.
First, the conflict and arising insecurity posed severe threats to
people’s lives and health (as indicated in several pathways in the
upper left of Figure 1). War-related injuries became more common,
resulting in long-term disabilities. Displacement and prolonged ex-
posure to dangerous situations (e.g. sieges) exacerbated psychologic-
al traumas and depleted the population’s ability to cope with stress.
The psychological status of people living at the shelter is pretty
bad. I can help those who come to me (. . .). I have 7–8 cases at
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the shelter with various conditions such as: depression, obsessive
disorders etc. and they are getting their treatments (Physician).
As insecurity increased, the availability of health services
decreased as some clinics were destroyed. For remaining facilities,
physical access barriers to health services increased. UNRWA was
permitted to work only in government-controlled areas.
Government bans to enter camps such as Yarmouk, Qabr Esset,
Khan Eshieh, Sbeineh, Husseiniyeh, Dera’a, Latakia and Ein ElTal
left created many hard-to-reach areas in Syria. Given severe access
barriers, communities increasingly relied on self-medicating behav-
iours and treatment in field hospitals (informal ‘treatment’ centres
staffed by non-medical personnel). Such practices often resulted in
health complications, treatment of which incurred an extra burden
on the UNRWA health system.
Secondly, overcrowding in temporary shelters (indicated in an
upper lower left of Figure 1) increased. Such overcrowding is known
to increase the risk of disease outbreaks and exacerbate population
health needs (Connolly et al., 2004).
Interviewees and GMB discussions also highlighted the lack of
safe water in shelters.
The water that’s being bought for use at the shelter affects the
gastrointestinal health because most likely it’s not clean water
(. . .) it’s a permanent problem because as I told you, there isn’t
any water supply in Aleppo. Water is supplied every four days
and its source is unknown (Physician).
Crowded living conditions additionally give rise to community stress.
In addition to potentially losing their home and loved ones, commun-
ities also had to cope with sharing limited space and resources.
For those living outside shelters, conditions also dramatically
deteriorated as they faced inflated living costs.
The people who are able to live outside the shelters aren’t any
well-off more than those living inside the shelters (. . .). Those liv-
ing outside the shelters need to pay rental fees and the weekly
bills for electricity and 2000 Liters of water supply a minimum
of 2000 SR and 3000 SR, respectively (Pharmacist).
The conflict also had unanticipated positive impacts on com-
munities. Community perceptions and attitudes towards persons
experiencing mental ill-health were reported to have become more
positive given the rising prevalence of such conditions (see Figure 1).
Health system challenges
The conflict primarily impacted the health system by compromising
its ability to maintain system hardware—i.e. health facilities and
associated supplies (e.g. medicines, fuel, water, etc.) and software—
i.e. the ability to ensure staff are present and committed to service
delivery (represented in the upper right of Figure 1). We distinguish
three primary threats to health system functioning.
First, the conflict compromised existing health infrastructure
and restricted the availability of medicines and medical supplies,
thus disrupting service continuity and availability.
From March-May 2014, the lab and the dentistry were inter-
rupted (. . .) when people came for vaccination, we told them we
don’t have. Because there’s no power supply, we didn’t used to
bring vaccines (Clerk).
Interview data suggested that when such amenities were scarce,
the quality of services was often compromised and delays ensued.
We don’t have electricity at the moment, no fuel oil for the gener-
ators and no proper heating at the Facility. Sometimes, we’re
using the flash light of our mobiles to see. As a clerk, sometimes,
I’m doing mistakes when writing the card numbers because I
can’t see well. I think the most important thing is to provide these
logistics. They are the basis of all operations (Clerk).
Service continuity was also affected by the governmental policies
that were put in place during the years of the conflict. Amenities
such as laboratory consumables, medications and diesel oil required
governmental approvals, which were often time-consuming to
secure.
We need to get permissions from the government and check
whether the area is safe or not. We’re facing difficulties in
Figure 1 UNRWA Syria systems model showing key pathways of threat arising due the ongoing conflict. Red arrows represent pathways of threat affecting ser-
vice delivery. Blue arrows represent the usual pathways of action between system components (Refer to the online colored version).
4 Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/heapol/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/heapol/czz129/5591540 by guest on 21 O
ctober 2019
transporting medications to the clinics because it requires the
same permissions. Also, other utilities that help in the daily func-
tioning of the clinic such as diesel oil, stationary etc. All these re-
quire permissions to be delivered. This is a timely procedure and
many clinics were affected by this new routine (UNRWA
Official).
Second, the conflict resulted in dramatic changes of health
service utilization. The population’s perception of access, safety and
financial risk—as well as the increased prevalence of injuries and
communicable diseases (among others)—meant that health needs
increased but access to care to health facilities was severely impeded.
Evidence suggests that insecurity around UNRWA’s health centres
suppressed utilization of services, as patients were afraid to travel
to health facilities; patients relied on self-treatment in such
circumstances.
When bombs were all over (next to the clinic), patients wouldn’t
risk their lives to come to the clinic. During that time, the num-
ber of patients would be around 50–60 patients a day (vs. 120–
130 a day) (Area Health Officer).
Several interviewees noted that when access to primary health-
care facilities was compromised, PRS prioritized curative over pre-
ventive treatments (e.g. vaccination).
[During conflict] people couldn’t arrive here to receive their med-
ications or vaccinate their children. (. . .) when some regions were
controlled by militias, they (patients) stopped coming here be-
cause the roads were blocked (Assistant Pharmacist).
In contrast, interviews with personnel in health centres located
in areas experiencing fewer war hostilities suggested a general in-
crease in patient attendance as refugees migrated to those areas.
Because people were displaced and many clinics closed, the num-
bers increased in other areas. For instance, over here the clinic is
accommodating a huge number of patients that would normally
be distributed among other health centers. So we have patients
that got displaced from Al-Yarmouk, Khan sheih, Sbeineh, and
Douma. They mostly come to this clinic because it’s safe at the
city center (Nurse).
Both GMB participants and interviewees reported that the con-
flict added more pressure on the system as the number of refugees
reliant on UNRWA services increased.
In 2012, we started noticing an increase in the numbers of
patients (. . .) Many were displaced, others quit their jobs etc.
Also, because of the economic inflation, many weren’t able to
pay for the hospitals or to buy medications on their own. Before
the crisis, very few used to come to UNRWA because they can’t
afford to pay. With the crisis, it became common (Management
staff).
By 2015, the number of PRS registered with UNRWA was
604 689, an increase of 34% compared with the year 2007 (unpub-
lished information provided by UNRWA-Syria). UNRWA records
show also that PRS accessing UNRWA healthcare services increased
by 17% from 2009 to 2014.
Third, the conflict and the resulting insecurity also severely com-
promised staff capacity. The war has claimed the lives of at least
20 agency staff members, and left many with life-altering inju-
ries; an additional 26 staff are missing, kidnapped or detained
(UNRWA, 2017a). For remaining staff, their ability to cope and
deliver services is impeded by psychological distress and exposure
to violence and adversities at work and on their way to work.
A lot of times, we are faced with aggressive patients. Currently,
many of them threaten us with weapons, knowing that many
people carry weapons nowadays. It happens sometimes once or
twice a day (Nurse).
You have to bear in mind that even if one tries to separate the
psychological aspect from the tasks it’s hard to do so 100%. For
me, my psychological status affected my work (. . .) in certain
days, I try to avoid working or I would take a day-off because I
don’t want to harm the quality of my work (Dentist).
With staff capacity reduced, those remaining were then faced
with offering services to an increased number of refugees (the lower
right of Figure 1 maps the consequences of this trend). Staff capacity
was also compromised in cases when staff felt under-appreciated
whether due to failure of verbal recognition, unequal distribution of
workload or lack of appropriate financial compensation.
What mattered was that the administration didn’t even thank the
staff who worked during emergency situations. We know that it’s
our duty to come to work but again the staff who worked during
emergencies should have worked in a rotation and this also didn’t
happen. Imagine a physician working during shelling. Normally
and as per the UNRWA rules, one should stay at home. Instead,
we came to work but there was no word of appreciation. We
criticized this matter (Pharmacist).
Resilience capabilities
Figure 2 not only retains the primary threat pathways identified in
the previous sections but also adds the mitigation strategies
deployed by UNRWA in Syria. We list the principal resilience strat-
egies deployed by UNRWA-Syria with reference to the conceptual
framing of absorption, adaptation and transformation (Blanchet
et al., 2017). Funds needed for the implementation of mitigation
strategies were raised through emergency appeals and utilized
according to local priorities by field and area office decision-makers
(e.g. to procure medicine, generators, fuel, etc.).
Absorption: coping with increased utilization of services
at open clinics
Absorption is defined as a system’s ability to respond to population
needs using available human resources and organizational processes
(Alameddine et al., 2019). Two system behaviours, in particular,
reflected UNRWA’s absorptive capability.
First, at primary care level, staff covered for each other when
needed (i.e. via multi-tasking and task-shifting behaviours) to ensure
service delivery; such behaviours assisted in managing high work-
loads during peak utilization.
We didn’t have enough staff, yet all the remaining staff were very
cooperative with each other. For instance, you would find me
working at NCD, maternal and child care and dentistry at the
same time. Same thing applies to the midwife whereby she would
multitask at NCD station, dentistry etc. We were able to cover
for the lack in human resources (Nurse).
Second, the Security and Safety Division (SSD) within UNRWA,
which operates in accordance with the United Nations Department
for Safety and Security (UNDSS), was successful in communicating
potential threats for staff, thus ensuring both staff and patient safety
(UNRWA, 2016).
Many times the Security and Safety Division would circulate
memos stating that it’s unsafe for people to leave their homes for
a day or more because of bombings or other security reasons.
We, then, would circulate the safety instructions to our
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employees and inform the refugees that it’s unsafe to come to our
clinics. Thank God, the coordination was excellent between us,
the refugees and the Safety and Security Department (Area
Health Officer).
Adaptation: adjusting the system’s resources to
maintain service provision
Adaptation is defined by a system’s ability to adjust how its resources
operate without changing system structures (Alameddine et al.,
2019). We identified three adaptive system behaviours in this context.
First, the revision of emergency preparedness in 2012 (depicted
in the upper right of Figure 2) helped secure supplies and mitigate
the impact on hard-to-reach areas. For instance, emergency pre-
paredness measures relating to medication availability were insuffi-
cient prior to the crisis. Contingency medicine stocks (sometimes
double the usual amount disbursed) were put in place in different
areas to prevent stock rupture in case of critical situations.
We used to provide medications enough for 3 months whereas dur-
ing the conflict, we started providing medications enough for 6
months. Half the amount for emergency use and the other half for
regular use. The emergency stock is always kept on the side in
order to secure the needed amounts in case roads between Aleppo
and Damascus were blocked or in case medications couldn’t be
delivered or purchased for any reason (Area Health Officer).
In response to scarcity in power supply, fuel and water supply,
UNRWA responded by digging wells and by renting generators
along with their diesel fuel supply for use at the shelters and the
health centres.
Second, enhancing existing collaborations was another source of
adaptation (reflected in upper section of Figure 2). During GMB dis-
cussions, participants noted extending existing UNRWA collabor-
ation mechanisms with governmental, local and international
partners.
Such partnership within the UN Health Cluster, which in turn
co-ordinated with the Syria government, was helpful in maintaining
services in hard-to-reach areas. Throughout the crisis, UNRWA-
Syria co-ordinated with the Syria Government only (as opposed to
other warring parties) to mobilize medicine, provide health services,
humanitarian aid, etc. across the country.
When vaccinations couldn’t arrive from the Field Office in
Damascus, we started getting vaccines from the Ministry of
Health (. . .) the availability of vaccines and the cooperation be-
tween us and the governor of Aleppo was a very strong aspect
about our service (Area Health Officer).
Later in the crisis, co-ordination with the government to speed
up the process of releasing medicine stock from the port also proved
beneficial.
Third, UNRWA altered its service network (mapped in the lower
right of Figure 2) in order to serve PRS who have been internally dis-
placed and to compensate for the inactivity of UNRWA health
centres located at opposition-controlled areas, such as at Yarmouk
camp. It opened mobile clinics and health points in hard-to-reach
areas or those areas with significant populations of displaced refu-
gees. In total, UNRWA opened 11 health points throughout the
country (UNRWA, 2013).
Figure 2 Mitigating strategies deployed by UNRWA Syria in response to challenges. Orange lines represent strategies driven by the system’s absorptive capacity;
green lines represent strategies driven by the system’s adaptive capacity; and pink lines represent strategies driven by the system’s transformative capacity. The
yellow line depicts the health reforms that were pre-planned before the conflict arose. Dotted lines refer to information flows (with no associated valence).
MHPSS, Mental Health and Psychosocial support; FHT, Family Health Team; OCHA, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; WHO,
World Health Organization; HR, Human Resource (Refer to the online colored version).
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Those who were displaced from Ein-Eltal (Aleppo) had their
own health point established for them immediately so the service
they used to get previously became available for them and closer
in proximity than before; the physician is technically with them
in the same building (UNRWA Official).
Access to hotspot locations was delivered through inter-agency
convoy missions that were carried out according to strict security
processes set by the SSD at UNRWA which liaised with the Syria
government.
Recognizing the need for further referrals and better reimburse-
ment coverage, the referral network was expanded to 27 hospitals
across the country (compared with 10 hospitals pre-conflict;
UNRWA, 2017a) and UNRWA revised its reimbursement coverage
ceiling moving from 75% reimbursement of secondary and tertiary
healthcare to 95%.
Transformation: creating new services and systems of
operation that did not exist prior to the shock
UNRWA’s reflection on current conditions and effectiveness of re-
sponse to patient and staff needs was a foundation for demonstrat-
ing transformative capacity: when needed, the system was able to
change its structure and add and maintain new services (reflected in
the purple pathways in the upper right of Figure 2).
As the conflict progressed, UNRWA sought to mitigate one of
the worst impacts of the war—increased mental health conditions
and psychosocial distress—by introducing new services such as
Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) to patients and
the staff alike in 2016 (UNRWA, 2017a).
Of course, new things were put in place. We were trained on psy-
chosocial support after the crisis (. . .) specifically on psychologic-
al gaps (. . .) even now, we have psychosocial support staff on
board with us at the clinic. That made us capable of offering help
to those with psychological conditions. You know, in such a cri-
sis, it’s pretty normal to receive such cases. That knowledge was
something that we gained during the crisis. Before, I didn’t have
to deal with such cases but now, since they’re becoming common,
we got trained to deal with such patients (Senior Medical
Officer).
Another example of UNRWA’s deployment of transformative
capacity was its expansion of reimbursement to include prosthetic
devices needed, as of November 2014, to support patients suffering
from war-related injuries (UNRWA, 2015a).
Features of UNRWA’s health system which enabled
resilience
Decisions at UNRWA are normally taken at the Headquarter Office
in Jordan; however, in the context of a conflict, field offices are typ-
ically given substantial discretion for decision-making. GMB partici-
pants confirmed that communication with UNRWA headquarters
was severely disrupted due to the direct damage that was inflicted
on phone lines and wireless towers; operational decisions relating to
health services and their organization were, therefore, devolved to
UNRWA field office levels. In turn, the field office also allowed for
flexible decision-making at clinic or area levels, when areas became
inaccessible due to the conflict (e.g. local procurement of
medicines).
Figure 3 shows three ‘balancing loops’ which serve to restore
functioning towards previous levels. All loops were mediated by
‘decision-making’, underlining its crucial role in enhancing
service utilization (balancing loop B1), staff attendance (balanc-
ing loop B2) and service accessibility (balancing loop B3).
Regarding B1, we note that as service utilization increased, exac-
erbating staff pressure, the area, clinic and field level responded by
increasing staff capacity, both through hiring new staff and provid-
ing training sessions to available staff at the health centres.
Although hiring was reported to be challenging in Syria due to lack
of health workers in the job market, the prompt decisions taken at
the Syria Field Office informed a new hiring procedure that permit-
ted recruiting daily per diem staff. Upon increasing staff capacity,
service offer and quality increased, allocation of staff to new health
centres and deploying staff to hard-to-reach areas remained possible
thus, maintaining service utilization.
Regarding human resources, many of employees travelled outside
country or retired and this led to a huge decrease in the number
of available staff. At that time, they were replaced by temporary
staff (casual posts) up until the beginning of 2017 where they got
appointed as permanent staff (Lab Technician).
Regarding loop B2, with the majority of staff being Palestinians,
a strong sense of identification with communities was a key dynamic
in service provision and continuity throughout the Syria crisis
(Alameddine et al., 2019). Combined with organizational flexibility,
this was a key driver of resilience. For example, the Syria Field
Office reduced clinic and staff duty hours and working days to en-
sure staff could safely reach their place of work. New operating
hours became aligned to times when patients were likely to access
the clinic, taking into consideration the severity of the conflict at a
certain time. Health staff were given the freedom to report to work
at clinics that were closest to their place of residence. Further, when
insecurity peaked, UNRWA managed to operate with minimal staff
numbers.
At some point in time, when bombings were taking place around
the health centers, we decreased the number of staff at the clinics.
We created ‘emergency groups’ that include the minimum num-
ber of staff that’s capable of providing an acceptable service to
the refugees (Area Health Officer).
The support given to UNRWA’s staff went beyond seeking to
protect their lives to include services that addressed their psycho-
logical well-being.
I requested to meet with a therapist because I needed to talk (. . .)
at the end, our psychological state was negatively affected by the
crisis so I think, it’s a good thing to have such a service (Dentist).
The third balancing loop, B3, was also driven by field office deci-
sion-making. Although it is normally contrary to UNRWA
Headquarters’ policy to reimburse for treatments that take place
outside its referral network, in Syria UNRWA flexed procedures to
evaluate reimbursement claims for procedures that took place at
non-contracted hospitals. This decision by the field office both
improved physical accessibility to healthcare and also increased af-
fordability of health services at the household level.
Normally, there are certain things that we don’t reimburse but,
because of the crisis or because sometimes the patient wasn’t able
to reach a hospital we contracted with, we still reimburse
patients. Although normally, this is against our policy. We evalu-
ate the cases case by case (UNRWA Official).
Therefore, operational decisions on mobilizing and deploying
resources within Syria were to a great extent left to the discretion of
the Syria Office. However, this devolved decision-making was
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facilitated with strong support from UNRWA headquarters (e.g.
resources deployed in Syria were covered by emergency appeals
raised by Headquarters).
Discussion
This study presents the first analysis of the resilience of UNRWA
health systems during the Syria crisis. Although key threats to indi-
viduals and communities are noted, the core focus challenges to the
health system and the absorptive, adaptive and transformative strat-
egies deployed to mitigate these. The study makes innovative use of
systems dynamic modelling to identify factors that served to support
or block resilience strategies across the health system, highlighting
balancing loops which served to stabilize the system in response to
shocks. It adds to the very limited literature to date that empirically
examines resilience strategies and capacities in health systems and
organizations [studies by Ager et al. (2015b) in the context of Boko
Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and Gilson et al. (2017)
regarding ‘everyday’ resilience demonstrated in African District
Health Management Teams being exemplars of emerging
approaches]. In a subsequent work, we aim to explore further the
potential for modelling to incorporate quantitative data to elaborate
on the analysis of resilience presented in this article (Ager et al.,
2018).
The shock to the UNRWA health system in Syria was substan-
tial. At the time when individual and community needs were signifi-
cantly escalating, the UNRWA health system suffered from
restricted availability of human resources, supplies and functional
infrastructure. UNRWA had contingency and emergency prepared-
ness plans in place prior to the crisis, e.g. to ensure medicine supplies
were available in case of stock-outs. However, participants noted
that given the scale of the emergency—particularly the destruction
of Yarmouk—emergency plans needed major revision (e.g. re-
establishing supply of medicines and securing higher buffer stocks).
The nature, magnitude, duration and outcomes of conflict pushed
UNRWA health programmes out of established patterns of response
into innovation.
Decentralized operational decision-making, e.g. was utilized dur-
ing crisis, as a necessary deviation from the relative rigidity and
abidance to standard procedure to ensure service continuity. Other
adaptive procedures, such as digging wells and renting generators
along with their diesel fuel supply, involved approaches well beyond
the parameters of existing contingency planning and represented in-
novation in the face of acute delivery challenges. Flexibility and
adaptation became an existential requirement; without this, services
could not have been sustained.
The agency moving from centralized decision-making to a more
decentralized model and suspending a hiring freeze to establish
more flexible approach to secure its workforce are two prominent
exemplars of the strategies adopted.
Several lessons can be drawn from UNRWA’s experience in
Syria. First, shifting decision-making power from a central decision-
making node to operating managers at the area, clinic and/or field
office level appeared to be a key facilitator for resilience. Evidence
from other studies suggests that, in regards to human resource man-
agement, decentralization of decision-making to health managers
Figure 3 Causal Loop Diagram depicting the influence of clinic, area and field office decision-making.
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improves work performance (Alonso-Garbayo et al., 2017) and can
further contribute to the resilience of a health system (Mckenzie
et al., 2016; Witter et al., 2017).
Second, empowering staff bolsters their sense of motivation and
commitment and supports service delivery when a system’s resour-
ces become severely constrained. Staff engagement is a powerful re-
source for organizations facing any type of crisis (Saji, 2014).
Findings from interviews and GMB discussions showed that having
Palestinian staff on duty created a commonality of purpose with the
organization and enhanced the staff’s commitment to serve fellow
refugees. Providing psychological support to employees and chang-
ing models of working (e.g. by allowing staff to work close to home)
documented how UNRWA sought to address the well-being of its
staff.
Third, we highlight UNRWA’s capacity to learn from previous
exposure to conflict and resulting emergency preparedness protocols
as an enabler of resilience. Two facets are relevant to this: creating
buffer stocks of key physical resources and deploying these flexibly,
and effective communication both internally in UNRWA and with
external partners. Previous research emphasized the importance of
resource availability as a strong enabler in organizational resilience
(Lembani et al., 2015). When displacement took place and upon the
destruction of UNRWA’s health centres, UNRWA mobilized its
resources by opening 15 health points at temporary shelters, estab-
lishing a mobile clinic in hard-to-reach areas, and deploying emer-
gency health teams to areas of active conflict. All of these served to
prevent undue service disruption during the crisis. The resources
deployed in Syria during the crisis were covered by emergency
appeals and were not at the cost of other field offices or activities.
Similarly, research shows information flow enables timely and
adequate adaptation to challenges (Ager et al., 2015b; Lap~ao et al.,
2015). UNRWA’s liaison with governmental entities, international
partners and across the UNRWA-Syria network assisted in the mo-
bilization of resources (e.g. medicine stocks between health centres
and in hard-to-reach areas) that are crucial for emergency response.
The history, mandate and culture of UNWRA are likely part of
the explanation for the resilience capacities documented here. The
agency has been functioning in an environment of chronic uncer-
tainty for about 70 years (UNRWA, 2015b), which may have
enabled it to considerably hone its crisis-response strategies.
Although UNRWA-Syria represents a field office accustomed to
relatively stable operations, response to events such as the destruc-
tion of Al-Yarmouk and the associated displacement of PRS could
draw upon absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities
demanded in response to previous crises in Gaza, the West Bank and
Lebanon. More proximally, the implementation of healthcare
reforms across the five fields of UNRWA operations coincided with
the Syria crisis. Reforms such as the E-Health system (a bespoke
computerized medical records and appointment system) had a mod-
est impact on supporting resilience in Syria as the implementation it-
self was difficult due to lack of basic amenities. Nonetheless,
reforms as well as transformative strategies (e.g. reimbursement pol-
icies) became permanent changes unlike adaptive responses (such as
opening of shelters) which are typically withdrawn depending on
current stressors.
Finally, in terms of work culture, the fact that most of the
agency’s management and provider staff are refugees themselves cre-
ates a very particular sense of community solidarity which potential-
ly serves to mitigate some of the extreme pressures faced during
crises. Despite this exceptional context of UNRWA health provi-
sion, documenting the role of absorptive, adaptive and
transformative capacities enabling resilience is of clear relevance for
health systems operating in other fragile settings.
Conclusion
We used participatory methods, including causal loop modelling, to
understand a question of widespread policy relevance: how can
complex health systems cope with shocks and continue to function?
The UNWRA case study in Syria highlights important lessons for
other systems—not just in demonstrating some practical strategies
to absorb, adjust to and transform in relation to shocks but also re-
vealing important leverage points and factors that allow these strat-
egies to be pursued. Factors such as staff commitment,
organizational flexibility and collaboration and communication
mechanisms were identified as key resources in maintaining service
continuity. These in turn were supported by an organizational cul-
ture committed to staff and to the community served. Although the
unique structure and mandate of UNWRA and its experience of
managing chronic clearly shaped its approach to the crisis, wider les-
sons on resilience capacities and the ability of complex systems to
absorb, adapt and transform are of clear relevance to other health
systems globally.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online.
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